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Thomas Aquinas on Grace as  
a Mysterious Kind of Creature 
 
Although the question of whether, in the thought of St. Thomas 
Aquinas,1 the grace of justification or divinization is “created” or “un-
created” has received considerable attention in late 20th- and early 21st-
century scholarship, many of the questions and arguments proposed by 
those in favor of grace being uncreated have gone unanswered. Among 
these ancillary questions and arguments are those concerning the sub-
ject of grace for Aquinas, Aquinas’s classification of grace within the 
Aristotelian categories, and the reason for the mystery and uncon-
sciousness of grace. These questions appear unrelated, but, as will be 
seen in this paper, they are each logically connected to each other and 
to the overall thesis that sanctifying grace is created, not uncreated. 
This paper aims to make Aquinas’s thesis that grace is created more 
palatable to objectors by addressing each of these ancillary questions. 
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1 All citations from Thomas Aquinas are from the following editions and will be abbre-
viated as noted: Opera Omnia [=Leon.] (Rome: Leonine Commission, 1882-), the parts 
of which that are used being Quaestiones disputatae de veritate [=De Veritate] and 
Quaestiones disputatae de malo [=De Malo]; idem, Scriptum super libros Sententiarum 
[=In Script.], ed. R. P. Mandonnet and R. P. Maria Fabianus Moos, vol. 1–4 (Paris: 
Sumptibus P. Lethielleux, 1929–1947); idem, In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Ar-
istotelis Expositio [=In Metaph.], ed. M. R. Cathala, Raymundi Spiazzi (Italy: Marietti 
Editori, 1964); idem, Summa Theologiae [=S.Th.], ed. John Mortensen and Enrique 
Alarcón (Lander: The Aquinas Institute, 2012). All translations from the Latin are my 
own. 
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The greatly influential mid-twentieth century theologian, Karl 
Rahner, S.J., his intellectual disciple, Jerome Ebacher, O.C.S.O., and 
the contemporary theologian, Anna N. Williams, have each defended, 
in his or her own way, the thesis that the grace of justification or divini-
zation in Aquinas is uncreated grace, not created grace—God himself, 
and not a creature.2 Recently, both Luke Martin and Richard Cross have 
responded in distinct ways to this thesis as instantiated in the work of 
Williams.3 Although the present paper endorses the general arguments 
and conclusions of both Martin and Cross, both authors leave unan-
swered the ancillary questions on the subject, categorial status, and 
mystery or unconsciousness of grace. The result is that debate as to 
whether grace is created or uncreated in Aquinas’s thought remains 
unsettled with arguments for each side of the debate remaining unan-
swered. In this paper, I try to advance the debate toward a satisfactory 
settlement by addressing some of the questions previously only 
addressed by those in favor of grace being uncreated. 
The next two sections in this paper summarize the existing argu-
ments and interpretations of Aquinas given by Rahner, Ebacher, Wil-
liams, Martin, and Cross. The result of this analysis is a clear sense of 
what arguments have yet to be answered. The last section takes up the 
                                               
2 Karl Rahner, “Nature and Grace,” in Nature and Grace: Dilemmas in the Modern 
Church, trans. Dinah Wharton (New York, N.Y.: Sheed and Ward, 1964), 125; idem, 
“Some Implications of the Scholastic Concept of Uncreated Grace,” in Theological In-
vestigations, vol. 1: God, Christ, Mary and Grace, trans. Cornelius Ernst (Baltimore, 
Md.: Helicon Press, 1961), 320–321. In the former text, Rahner speaks of “diviniza-
tion,” but in the latter, “justification.” Although these are not the same thing, the point 
Rahner makes is clearly intended to refer to the same sense of “grace.” Jerome Ebacher, 
“Grace and Supernaturalization,” Angelicum 58, no. 1 (1981): 21–32. Anna Williams, 
The Ground of Union: Deification in Aquinas and Palamas (New York, N.Y.: Oxford 
University Press, 1999). See especially ibid., 87–89 and 191, note 29. Concerning other 
topics, Williams is not in agreement with the likes of Rahner. See, e.g.: ibid., 151. 
3 Luke Martin, “Williams, Aquinas, and Uncreated Grace,” New Blackfriars 98, no. 
1073 (2017): 34–43; Richard Cross, “Deification in Aquinas: Created or Uncreated?,” 
The Journal of Theological Studies 69, no. 1 (2018): 106–132. 




unanswered arguments of those defending a theory of uncreated sancti-
fying grace by showing the logical relation of Aquinas’s views on the 
subject of grace, its categorial classification, and its mystery and inac-
cessibility to consciousness. 
Karl Rahner and Jerome Ebacher 
In “Nature and Grace,” Karl Rahner, argues that “uncreated grace” 
is “the very essence of grace.”4 Rahner reaches this conclusion through 
the following inference: 
If . . . grace and glory are two stages of the one process of divini-
zation, and . . . in glory God communicates himself to the super-
naturally elevated created spirit in a communication which is not 
the efficient causal creation of a creaturely quality or entity dis-
tinct from God, but the quasi-formal causal communication of 
God himself, then this can also be applied to grace much more 
explicitly than it commonly has been in theology up till now.5 
Put differently, if [a] grace is the same as glory, but [b] glory is not a 
quality efficiently caused by and distinct from God, then [c] neither is 
grace distinct from God or efficiently caused by God. In the major 
premise, i.e. [b], Rahner sets up an opposition between, on the one 
hand, quasi-formal participation in God himself and, on the other hand, 
an accidental quality efficiently caused by and entitatively distinct from 
God. Rahner, concludes this line of reasoning with an ancillary argu-
ment directed at the same conclusion, but presumably of less weight. 
After having stated that uncreated grace is the very essence of grace, 
Rahner adds: “[W]hich also explains much better how grace can strictly 
be called a mystery, for a purely created entity as such can never be an 
absolute mystery . . . God communicates himself to man in his own re-
                                               
4 Rahner, “Nature and Grace,” 125. 
5 Ibid. 
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ality. That is the mystery and the fullness of grace.”6 Rahner seems to 
have in mind that only God is mysterious, so if grace is something cre-
ated, distinct from God, then grace is no mystery. 
Another point that Rahner makes in the same article, which this 
paper will address, is that “The supernatural grace through which man 
is justified and can do just works was [in neo-scholasticism] reguarded 
as something in itself beyond consciousness. This,” says Rahner, “is a 
theological opinion which has always been in dispute.”7 Rahner admits 
that, “The simplest experience and the teaching of the Council of Trent 
(DB, 802, 805, 825, 826) seem to endorse this view almost as a matter 
of course.”8 Drawing his own somewhat non-committal judgment about 
this standard non-conscious view of grace, Rahner says: “Would one be 
completely mistaken in seeing a connection with modern naturalism of 
this theory too? If it is true that the modern lack of interest in the super-
natural could only have developed on the basis of this conception of 
grace (which is of course in some measure nominalistic)?”9 Although 
Rahner confines his judgment to rhetorical questions rather than overt 
assertions, it is clear he rejects the view that grace is not consciously 
experienced and associates it with the heresy of naturalism and the het-
erodoxy of nominalism.  
“[I]nspired by the suggestive anthropological and transcendental 
developments of grace by Karl Rahner,” Jerome Ebacher, in an article 
called “Grace and Supernaturalization,” sets out “to trace in barest out-
line a doctrine of grace which finds its normal integration in the as-
sumptions and principles chiefly of St. Thomas Aquinas.”10 In his arti-
cle, Ebacher reaffirms the two theses that we have just seen Rahner pro-
                                               
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid., 115. 
8 Ibid., 116. 
9 Ibid., 119. 
10 Ebacher, “Grace and Supernaturalization,” 21. 




pose. Moreover, Ebacher draws a logical connection between these two 
theses, which is only implicit in Rahner. Ebacher also significantly de-
velops the views espoused by Rahner. All the while, Ebacher continues 
to cite St. Thomas and gives no indication that the theory of grace he 
describes is opposed to Aquinas’s own theory of grace. 
Like Rahner, Ebacher draws the distinction between uncreated 
and created grace, but he is clearer about what the difference between 
these two is. “Considered objectively,” he says, “grace is the reality of 
God communicated in his true, physical essence and life to the justified 
soul; it is the actual (quasi-formal) divinization of the very substance of 
the soul, but more immediately of the faculties of the soul . . . This is 
obviously uncreated grace.”11 So, for Ebacher, grace is God himself 
considered as formally participated by a creature. The subject of this 
participation is immediately the faculties of the soul and secondarily the 
substance of the soul. Ebacher goes on to describe created grace, which 
receives only minimal attention in the remainder of the article: “Created 
grace . . . is the soul’s individual and measured reception of divine 
life.”12 Both kinds of grace, says Ebacher, are “accidental to the soul, 
for the soul is not substantially altered in its own proper essence and 
creatureliness, but only raised, by virtue of its union, to a bio-functional 
dignity to which it had no intrinsic natural claim.”13 It is important to 
notice here that Ebacher does not call both kinds of grace “accidents,” 
but only “accidental to the soul.” Presumably, Ebacher thinks that God 
himself (who is uncreated grace) cannot be an accident inhering in the 
soul but can somehow be accidental to the soul inasmuch as he is out-
                                               
11 Ibid., 22. Cf. ibid.: “It does nonetheless remain that the objective reality of uncreated 
grace, as being God communicated to the spiritual substance and faculties of the soul is 
the infinite, immutable and eternal God.”  
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid. 
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side the essence of the soul.14 Another important thing to notice is that 
Ebacher sees the union brought about by grace as “bio-functional” rath-
er than natural. As Ebacher says, the nature or substance of the creature 
cannot itself be altered. Thus, the change brought about by grace must 
be in the operations or functions of the creature, not its nature. We will 
return to this point later. 
Following Rahner, after having distinguished the two kinds of 
grace, Ebacher turns to the topic of mystery. “Supernaturalization,” he 
says, “is a mystery. But it is a mystery only because it involves the na-
ture of God himself. In the mind of Scheeben, all mysteries can be re-
duced to but one single mystery, simply because their involvement with 
the divinity makes of them a mystery. Anything created is per se know-
able.”15 Like Rahner, Ebacher thinks that God alone is mysterious. Crea-
tures, on the other hand, are knowable per se. From this, Ebacher con-
cludes that, since the “psychological factors involved in the ‘mystery’ 
of grace” are created, they “are therefore subject to human understand-
ing and do not constitute properly so-called the mystery about grace.”16 
In the remainder of his article, Ebacher goes on to assert several 
new propositions concerning divinization. The first two are closely 
linked: one concerning the “proper and immediate recipient of the di-
vine life,” the other concerning “the manner of union which is effected 
through grace.”17 Ebacher begins by discussing the manner of union, 
and then concludes to the proper recipient of divine life. “[U]pon being 
communicated,” says Ebacher, “the divine life will be both given and 
received according to its own proper modality, that is to say, it will not 
be given or received as a static reality or mere presence, but as a spirit-
                                               
14 Cf. Aquinas, In VII Metaph., l. 13, 1581–82. 
15 Ebacher, “Grace and Supernaturalization,” 22. 
16 Ibid., 22–23. 
17 Ibid., 23. 




ual function or life.”18 From this assertion, which Ebacher does not sup-
port with any argument, Ebacher reaches the following conclusion a-
bout the sort of union effected by grace. “If this is so, then we may as-
sume likewise that the immediate and proper recipient of grace must be 
a spiritual power or faculty which can harmonize, in its own specific 
operation, with the proper modality of the divine life.”19 Ebacher con-
cedes that “the substance itself of the soul is also divinized, but only 
statically (per modum essentiae) or entitatively, forasmuch as the di-
vine principle of life is made present to it. But it is the faculties of the 
soul that are the immediate recipients of the divine life.”20 Evidently, 
Ebacher has in mind that the divine life is life in the sense of second 
act, not first act. Thus, since it is the powers or “faculties” of the soul 
rather than the substance of the soul, which proximately performs the 
operations of life, it follows that the immediate recipient of divine life 
must be the soul’s powers, not its substance. 
Ebacher then asserts a third proposition similar to one we saw in 
Rahner—namely, that grace “is said to differ from glory, not in kind, 
but in degree. Glory is the vision of God.”21 This leads to a fourth prop-
osition: “We may accordingly establish a further proposition,” says 
Ebacher.  
If the divine life is communicated in accordance with the nature 
of the immediate recipient of grace (the faculties), it follows that 
the active intellect (in the measure of its limited and created ca-
pacity) will be made aware, through the reality of sanctifying 
grace (and in the obscurity of informed supernatural faith) not of 
an image of the divine essence . . . but of the divine essence itself 
in its physical entity and immediacy.22 




21 Ibid., 24. 
22 Ibid., 24–25. 
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To support this conclusion, Ebacher reminds readers that the divine es-
sence cannot be known by any created image or medium since none is 
adequate to God. Later on, he says, “whatever the light of glory is, it is 
certainly not something which allows us to see God—it is rather in the 
nature of a removal of any obstacle.”23 Of course, Ebacher is aware that 
he faces an obvious objection. If grace is itself the activity of the divine 
life in the mind and if, even with grace, prior to glory, the active intel-
lect is made aware of the divine essence immediately, then why is it 
that we patently do not experience the the divine essence? To counter 
this objection, Ebacher makes two points. First, he notes that Aquinas 
does not absolutely speaking rule out seeing God’s essence while still 
in the body since even St. Paul did this. He only rules out seeing God’s 
essence given “our present and gross state of union of body and soul.”24 
Second, Ebacher distinguishes between conscious vision of God’s es-
sence, on the one hand, and, presumably, a non-conscious vision of 
God’s essence, on the other. He says: “Ecstasy, which frees the soul 
more or less from its normal functioning as the form of the body and as 
its principle of organization, does permit of transitorial experiential 
knowledge of God, his essence and even the Trinity, as mystics have 
many times attested.”25 The assumption here seems to be that ecstasy 
removes the aforementioned present and gross state of union with the 
body, and as a result we become conscious of the immediate vision of 
God’s essence, which we already unconsciously had by grace. From 
this analysis, Ebacher reaches his grand conclusion:  
Hence, informed supernatural faith can be nothing else than in-
fused, intuitive, experiential, and consequently participated pro-
cessional knowledge of the divine nature, notwithstanding the 
incidental obscureness of this immediate vision in our present 
                                               
23 Ibid., 26. 
24 Ibid., 25. 
25 Ibid. 




state of union of body and soul . . . I believe, in harmony with the 
traditional teaching, that the activity of the soul, in this present 
state of union with the body, is normally so wholly absorbed in 
the teleological organization of matter as hardly to admit of intui-
tive acts, even on the purely natural plane. It is well known, for 
example, that flashes of intuitive knowledge natural or supernat-
ural, are inevitably accompanied by the phenomenon of ecstasy, 
and that any prolonged experience of this nature involves a par-
tial suspension of normal organic functioning.26 
In short, we know God’s essence immediately by faith even now, but 
are not conscious of this immediate knowledge except when in a state 
of ecstasy in which the obstacle of organic functioning is removed. 
Ebacher goes on to conclude that the three theological virtues—faith, 
hope, and love—are found in the Trinity itself by analogy and are even 
constitutive of the divine persons.27 But discussing this further conclu-
sion is beyond the scope of what this paper can do. In the next section, 
we must look at what has already been said implicitly against the posi-
tion of Rahner and Ebacher by Cross and Martin, who have taken ob-
jection to Williams’ view that the grace that sanctifies is uncreated, not 
created. The section after that will address the arguments of Rahner, 
Ebacher, and Williams not answered by Cross and Martin. 
Williams, Martin, and Cross on Uncreated Grace 
In her study of deification in Aquinas and Palamas, Anna N. Wil-
liams states that one of the greatest obstacles to union between theolo-
gians, East and West, on the topic of sanctifying grace is the notion of 
created grace.28 Williams thinks, however, that Aquinas does not con-
tribute to this obstacle. “The first indication of the oddity of applying 
such a category [i.e., created grace] to the theology of the Summa is the 
                                               
26 Ibid., 26. 
27 Ibid., 27. 
28 Williams, The Ground of Union, 87. 
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sheer difficulty of finding uses of gratia creata at all. None appears in 
the treatise on grace itself, despite its elaborate taxonomy . . . Even the 
comprehensive Lexicon of St. Thomas Aquinas mentions created grace 
only in passing and furnishes no reference to the Summa.”29 Acknowl-
edging that this argument “from absence” might be weak, Williams adds 
that the burden of proof in favor of the view that Aquinas had a theory 
of created grace rests with those who disagree with her.30 While Rahner 
and Ebacher seem to identify grace with the divine nature under the 
aspect of being participated, it is unclear whether Williams holds this 
view. For Williams there is a spectrum of possible views about grace, 
ranging from that of simply identifying grace with the divine nature, on 
the one hand, and calling grace a “pure effect” or creature on the other: 
Where Thomas most consistently, and apparently most comfort-
ably, locates grace is in the center of a spectrum, at one of whose 
poles stands the identification of grace with divine nature, but at 
whose opposite pole stands the equation of grace and pure ef-
fects, such as virtue. He generally locates grace between these 
options, preferring to call it the creature’s participation of the 
Uncreated. Notably, however, he rules out the equation of grace 
and virtue, while leaving open the possibility of equating grace 
and divine love, as we have seen.31 
Williams backs up her claim that Aquinas holds such a via media view 
by pointing out how Aquinas denies that grace is a virtue.32 Her reason-
ing, here, seems to be that if grace were created (i.e., a pure effect), then 
it would be a virtue. But it isn’t a virtue, according to Aquinas. There-
fore, neither does Aquinas view grace as a pure effect. This claimed via 
media thesis, however, is ambiguous. Is saying that grace is neither 
                                               
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid.: “One might counter this line of reasoning with the objection that it suffers from 
the usual weakness of an argument from absence. This charge may be met with the e-
qually formal objection that the burden of proof lies on those who make assertions.” 
31 Ibid., 85. Emphasis added. 
32 Ibid. See S.Th., I–II, q. 110, a. 3, co. 




simply identified with the divine nature nor created consistent with the 
Rahnerian view that grace is the divine nature as participated? It would 
seem so. How else could we interpret Williams when, at the same time 
she denies that grace should be simply identified with the divine nature, 
she simultaneously says: “What grace is, most truly and fundamentally, 
is gratia increata, the Holy Spirit, God ipse”?33 
Both Martin and Cross object to the claim that Williams would 
be making were she, in fact, to mean what we have here interpreted her 
to mean—namely, that grace is God himself considered under the as-
pect of being participated by creatures. Martin, however, unlike Cross, 
argues that what in fact Williams asserts about uncreated grace is never 
made clear in her book.34 Both Martin and Cross make unique argu-
ments against Williams. Neither, however, addresses Williams infer-
ence from the fact that grace is not a virtue to the conclusion that grace 
is uncreated. As I will show in the next section, the mistake underlying 
this inference is logically connected to how we must answer Rahner 
and Ebacher’s concern about the mystery of grace. For now, we will 
briefly summarize the existing progress in the debate about created 
grace made by Martin and Cross, respectively. 
Martin points out two theses in Aquinas’s thought that seem in-
compatible with Williams’ view—absent further clarification on her 
                                               
33 Williams, The Ground of Union, 89. 
34 Martin, “Williams, Aquinas, and Uncreated Grace,” 43: “However, I suggest that 
given the absence of an account of uncreated grace from Williams . . . the burden of 
proof is back on her, as a clearer account is required.” Ibid., 34: “I conclude that Wil-
liams’ account is unclear and in need of clarification.” Ibid., 36: “I argue that it is un-
clear what Williams means by suggesting Aquinas view grace as uncreated, given the 
constraints of Thomas’ thought.” Along similar lines, Luke Davis Townsend, “Deifica-
tion in Aquinas: A Supplementum to The Ground of Union,” The Journal of 
Theological Studies 66, no. 1 (2015): 204–234, concludes: “[Williams] fails to provide 
a clear definition of deification; she fails to provide a full account of what Thomas 
means when he speaks of deification” (ibid., 234). 
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part.35 First, grace is an accidental quality.36 Second, according to the 
doctrine of divine simplicity, God does not enter into composition with 
any creature, either as a material or as a formal principle.37 Thus, grace 
cannot be the divine nature as formally participated. After giving this 
argument against Williams, Martin gives a possible reply to himself.38 
In Christ, the divine nature does seem to enter into composition with 
something—namely, into a hypostatic composition with human nature. 
As Martin notes, this is an analogous composition, not a composition 
strictly so-called. Might not we “suggest that God’s presence in persons 
[other than Christ] also involves analogous composition, but of a dif-
ferent kind from the incarnation”?39 At this point, Martin attempts to 
                                               
35 Martin, “Williams, Aquinas, and Uncreated Grace,” 36–37. 
36 Martin doesn’t cite Aquinas, here, but we could cite for him: S.Th., I–II, q. 110, a. 2; 
De Veritate, q. 27, a. 2, ad 7. Since Martin’s argument is one concerning the right inter-
pretation of Aquinas, it suffices that we note Aquinas’s own claim that grace is an acci-
dental form. Nevertheless, it is also worth noting that the magisterium has committed it-
self to the identification of sanctifying grace with an inhering form also. Evaluating au-
thoritative pronouncements on the matter, Ludwig Ott puts the two propositions, “Sanc-
tifying Grace is a supernatural state of being which is infused by God, and which per-
manently inheres in the soul” and “Sanctifying grace is not a substance, but a real acci-
dent, which inheres in the soul-substance,” both under the category of sententia certa: 
Fundamentals of Catholic Dogma, trans. Patrick Lynch (Fort Collins, Colo.: Roman 
Catholic Books, 1954), 255. Melissa Eitenmiller, likewise, notes that to deny “a true, 
inward inherence of the grace of justification in the soul” would put one under the 
condemnations of the Council of Trent, which affirmed such an inherence in opposition 
to the merely external imputation of justification envisioned by Luther (idem, “Grace as 
Participation According to St. Thomas Aquinas,” New Blackfriars 98, no. 1078 [2017]: 
705). So, if one accepts the magisterial teaching of the Church concerning grace, it 
would seem one must also accept the truth of Aquinas’s claim that grace is an 
accident—that is, something inhering in the one graced. Then again, if the magisterial 
teaching of the Church is accepted, it would also seem that one would be forced to 
accept Martin’s anti-Williams conclusion also since Ott puts the proposition, 
“Sanctifying Grace is a created supernatural gift really distinct from God,” at a higher 
level of certainty than the proposition concerning its inherence, namely, sententia fidei 
proxima. Ott, Fundamentals of Catholic Dogma, 254. 
37 Martin cites: S.Th., I, q. 3, a. 8. 
38 Martin, “Williams, Aquinas, and Uncreated Grace,” 37–38. 
39 Ibid., 38. 




develop a view he attributes to Karl Rahner and Karen Kilby.40 Like the 
view we already saw in Rahner and Ebacher, this solution maintains 
that God, in grace, communicates himself as “a quasi-formal cause,” 
but this solution adds the specification that God himself actually be-
comes an accidental form in the creature without becoming thereby “en-
tangled” with the creature.41 Kilby’s notion of God being “unentangled” 
is glossed by Martin as meaning that, when God is an accidental form 
of the creature, he is not like created accidental forms, which are onto-
logically dependent and mere instrumental causes.42 Instead, as acci-
dental form, God continues to be principal actor and ontologically in-
dependent. Martin ultimately dismisses this Rahner-Kilby-inspired so-
lution for saving Williams’ theory of grace on the grounds that an un-
entangled accident seems to be a contradiction in terms.43 Whereas 
there can be analogical composition with the divine nature in Christ 
since this composition takes place at the level of substance, which is 
ontologically independent, it seems impossible for God to enter an anal-
ogous composition with individual Christians through the accident of 
grace since turning God into an accidental form would undermine God’s 
freedom and ontological independence. Martin, thus, concludes that un-
less Williams further clarifies her position, her position seems incon-
sistent with Aquinas’s own principles that God cannot enter composi-
tion with a creature and that grace is an accidental quality. 
Richard Cross offers a different and more definitive response to 
Williams’ view that sanctifying grace is uncreated in Aquinas’s thought. 
Cross first responds to Williams’ argument from absence—namely, the 
                                               
40 As found in: Karen Kilby, Karl Rahner: Theology and Philosophy (London: Routl-
edge, 2004); Karl Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faith: An Introduction to the Idea 
of Christianity (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1978), esp. 119 and 121. 
41 Martin, “Williams, Aquinas, and Uncreated Grace,” 39, who cites: Kilby, Karl Rah-
ner, 56 and 121. 
42 Martin, “Williams, Aquinas, and Uncreated Grace,” 39–40. 
43 Ibid., 40–41. 
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argument that Aquinas almost never mentions created grace, but men-
tions uncreated grace frequently. “In reality, however,” says Cross, “the 
situation is quite the opposite [of what Williams claims]. Aquinas fre-
quently uses the term gratia creata throughout his oeuvre . . . but he 
uses the term gratia increata merely once in the context of discussion 
of salvific grace, to talk about ‘the Holy Spirit, God ipse’, in the early 
Sentences commentary.”44 Here, Cross is accusing Williams of a rather 
straight-forward and embarrassing factual error. A search of gratia in-
creata and “=gratia =increata” in Robert Busa’s Index Thomisticus 
search engine does more or less support Cross’s claim about uncreated 
grace. The phrase shows up three times, all within book 3 of the Sen-
tences commentary.45 In contrast, a search of “=gratia =creata” reveals 
the phrase being used tens of times and in multiple works—the Sen-
tences, De Veritate, and the Summa theologiae. This disparity of usage 
reverses the onus of proof back onto Williams, Rahner, and Ebacher. 
They have the burden to show that, when Aquinas speaks of sanctifying 
grace or the grace that deifies, he has in mind uncreated grace, which 
seems to be a rather rare use of the word “grace” in Aquinas’s thought. 
Even if those who sympathize with Williams interpretation of A-
quinas are still suspicious of Cross’s interpretation on the grounds that 
Aquinas’s use of the phrase “created grace” is infrequent, Cross has an 
answer to such a suspicion. 
Why, then, the near silence on created grace in the Summa’s trea-
tise on grace? The short answer, I think, is that the matter simply 
was not controversial—it was obvious that habitual grace was 
something created. That grace is some kind of disposition or hab-
it of the soul—and thus an accident—was a commonplace of 
twelfth century theology. Given the scarcely controversial as-
sumption that God cannot be a form or accident of a creature . . . 
                                               
44 Cross, “Deification in Aquinas,” 108–109. 
45 In III Script., d. 2, q. 2, a. 1, qc. 1, ad 2; ibid., d. 13, q. 3, a. 1, co.; and in one of the 
redactions. 




it follows immediately and obviously that habitual grace is some-
thing created. The teaching is found explicitly in the Fran-
ciscans—the Summa fratris Alexandri and Bonaventure, for ex-
ample—and was not at this time a topic of hot dispute.46 
In other words, Cross endorses the same position that Luke Martin 
came to in his response to Williams—namely, that God cannot be an 
accidental form of a creature. Thus, given that it was taken for granted 
by medieval theologians (and explicitly stated by Aquinas)47 that grace 
is an accident, it follows that grace is not God himself, but a creature. 
This, according to Cross, is such an obvious inference that medieval 
theologians found little need to explicitly bring it up. 
After giving this response to Williams’ argument based on the 
supposed infrequency of the word “created grace” in Aquinas, Cross 
goes to the heart of the mistake made by theologians, such as Williams, 
Rahner, Ebacher, and Kilby, when they set up, as we have seen, a di-
chotomy between grace being a quasi-formal participation in the divine 
nature, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, grace being a created 
accident. For Cross, these two things are not opposed, but, on the con-
trary, the former entails the latter. Cross makes this point in the context 
of responding to Luke D. Townsend, who, while modifying Williams’ 
interpretation in some details, keeps her essential position that “Since 
through his indeclinable power, God gives himself, deification mani-
festly occurs through uncreated grace.”48 In a footnote, Townsend says 
the indwelling of the Spirit is uncreated grace, but the gifts of the spirit 
and theological virtues are created graces.49 This is obviously remi-
                                               
46 Cross, “Deification in Aquinas,” 113–114. 
47 E.g., S.Th., I–II, q. 110, a. 2, ad 2. 
48 Townsend, “Deification in Aquinas,” 220. 
49 Ibid.: “Here, one should note that deification’s occurring by uncreated grace does not 
preclude the fact that created grace is also involved in the process. With the indwelling 
of the Holy Spirit, who is God’s gift of God’s self, also come the gifts and fruits of the 
Holy Spirit, and the virtues, which are created graces.” 
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niscent of Williams’ argument that, since Aquinas refuses to identify 
grace with virtue, he evidently takes grace not to be a creature, but God 
himself. For Townsend, the grace of union had now on earth and later 
in the beatific vision is an unmediated participation of the divine es-
sence and, therefore, not something created, but God himself.50 This 
line of reasoning from grace being a formal participation in divine na-
ture to grace being uncreated is common, as we have seen, to Rahner, 
Ebacher, Kilby, and Williams. In response to such an argument, as 
found in Townsend, Cross argues: 
Townsend identifies a catena of pasages in which Aquinas af-
firms that the believer participates in God, or in the divine nature 
or essence. But identifying such passages is not sufficient to 
show that participation in the divine is immediate in the sense 
that Townsend specifies. Clearly, Aquinas accepts that the be-
liever participates in God. He says so on multiple occasions, 
many of which Townsend quotes or references. The question is 
whether or not Aquinas believes that this claim is susceptible of 
further analysis—and if so, of what analysis . . . It turns out that 
Aquinas does indeed offer such an analysis, and that in this 
analysis he [Aquinas] simply identifies created grace and par-
ticipation: habitual grace is that in virtue of which someone is 
graced, and that in virtue of which someone participates in God.51 
                                               
50 Ibid., 231: “One sees here that the grace of union with God, regardless of whether it 
refers to initial or ultimate union, is necessarily a gift of uncreated grace. God’s gift of 
union with God’s self is not mediated. Rather, God’s gift to the creature is God’s own 
self and God’s own essence. This gift of uncreated grace is given presently to those 
who accept it, and will be received in its fullness in the beatific vision. The uncreated 
nature of the grace of union also follows from Thomas’s understanding of the beatific 
vision. In this vision, the rational creature will gaze upon God’s own essence, and 
thereby participate in that essence . . . Therefore, in summary, deification for Aquinas 
means becoming god by participation, which is to partake of and share in the essence of 
divinity. This participation begins with the creature’s justification and adoption as a 
child of God. It deepens with the creature’s sanctification and growth in deiformity; and 
ultimately, it becomes complete with the creature’s glorification and total deification.”  
51 Cross, “Deification in Aquinas,” 120–121. 




Cross goes on to invoke De Veritate, q. 27, a. 1, ad 10, where Aquinas 
distinguishes between something being immediate in terms of efficient 
causality and formal causality.52 God justifies us immediately in terms 
of efficient causality—that is, no agent besides God justifies us—but 
God does not justify us immediately in terms of formal causality. There 
is a form in us (i.e., habitual grace), which is that by which we are jus-
tified by God. As Cross explains, “claiming that paricipation is re-
ducible to a created quality does not in any way undermine the reality 
of participation—it does not eliminate participation from the theolog-
ical landscape. The created quality is the formal cause in virtue of 
which it is true that the creature participates in God.”53 Cross ultimately 
attributes the mistaken inference from grace being formal participation 
in God to grace being uncreated to a failure to correctly understand 
Aquinas’s adaptation of Platonic theology.54 
In summary, Rahner, Ebacher, Williams, Kilby, and Townsend 
all say that sanctifying grace or deification is uncreated, not created. 
Luke Martin says that sanctifying grace is created—unless someone can 
better clarify what is meant by “uncreated grace.” Richard Cross says 
that sanctifying grace is created, period. These are the opposing con-
clusions so far given. The arguments for these opposing conclusions 
have been partially, but not fully settled. On the side of Martin and 
                                               
52 Ibid., 121. 
53 Ibid., 126. 
54 Ibid., 132: “According to Aquinas, saying that God is the charity by which we love 
each other is to say not that charity is something uncreated, but rather that we partici-
pate in God’s charity. And this corrective presupposes that participation should be con-
strued as consisting in something created—a created habit of charity—rather than some-
thing uncreated—uncreated charity. After all, Aquinas wants to block the inference to 
uncreated charity, and he attempts to do so precisely by explaining Augustine’s lan-
guage in terms of participation. Ignorance of Platonic theology and its terms, then, have 
led Lombard into error. Aquinas’s comment is surely germane to the issues I have been 
discussing here: construing participation in terms of uncreated grace misunderstands A-
quinas, and, according to Aquinas himself, misrepresents the earlier theological tradi-
tion of which he takes himself to be a representative.” 
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Cross, there are two unanswered arguments. First, as Martin points out, 
if God is grace, but if Aquinas identifies grace with a quality, then God 
would enter into composition with a creature as an accidental form, 
which Aquinas says is impossible. Second, as Cross argues, if God 
were to be grace, then God would be in an accidental category since 
grace is in the category quality. But it was obvious to all medieval au-
thors that God is not in an accidental category. Neither Martin nor 
Cross’s arguments have been answered. On the opposing side—that of 
Rahner, Ebacher, Williams, Kilby, and Townsend—however, there are 
arguments for the opposite conclusion. First, all of those saying grace is 
uncreated, as we have seen, reason from the fact that grace is a (quasi-
formal) participation in the divine nature to the conclusion that grace is 
uncreated. This argument was sufficiently countered by Cross who 
showed it rested on a failure to grasp the nature of Aquinas’s Platonic 
metaphysics of participation. A second argument for uncreated grace 
was Williams’ argument from the rarity of the phrase “created grace” in 
Aquinas’s thought. This argument too was countered by Cross when he 
showed it was factually erroneous. Besides these two arguments, which 
have been addressed, there are other arguments in favor of grace being 
uncreated, which have not yet been addressed. These will be addressed 
in the next section. First, from Williams, there is the argument that, if 
Aquinas thought grace were a pure effect, he would have classified it as 
a virtue, but he says it is not a virtue. Therefore, he did not think it was 
a pure effect. A second unanswered argument has been suggested by 
Rahner and developed by Ebacher. That argument is this: Grace differs 
from glory not in kind, but only in degree. Yet, glory is God himself 
received in the powers of the soul in the beatific vision. Thus, grace too 
is God himself as participated in the powers of the soul. Finally, there is 
a third argument, again common to Rahner and Ebacher, which states 
that grace is a mystery, but that no creature is a mystery; thus grace is 
no creature, but instead God himself. In the next section, it remains to 




address these three arguments and to show their logical connection both 
to each other and to the question of whether grace is created or uncre-
ated. 
The Subject, Classification, and Mystery of Grace 
As we have seen, in order to defend the view that grace is uncre-
ated, Ebacher stated that the subject of grace is, like the subject of 
glory, immediately the faculties of the soul and only secondarily the es-
sence of the soul. This led to the conclusion that grace is a dynamic par-
ticipation in divine life and that, by having grace, one has immediate 
knowledge of the divine essence—whether or not one is currently con-
scious of this knowledge. Ebacher implied that, in laying out this rea-
soning, he was representing Aquinas’s own view. This, however, is not 
true, as can be seen by a careful consideration of what Aquinas says 
about the subject and classification of grace. From this consideration, 
we can also draw conclusions concerning other arguments we have seen 
raised by Rahner, Ebacher, and Williams in favor of grace being un-
created. In particular, we will find a reply to Williams’ argument that, 
since Aquinas denies grace is a virtue, grace must not be a pure effect 
(i.e., a creature). And we will find a reply to Rahner and Ebacher’s ar-
gument that, unless grace is the uncreated God himself, then it cannot 
be a mystery. 
Aquinas addresses the subject of grace consistently in both early 
to late works.55 To see this, we may begin with his early article, De 
Veritate, q. 27, a. 6 (1256–1259), whose express object is to determine 
whether grace is in the essence of the soul. In the corpus of this article, 
Aquinas presents two opinions, the former of which he rejects and the 
                                               
55 For the parenthetical dates assigned to Aquinas’s works, I follow the estimates found 
in: Jean-Pierre Torrell, Saint Thomas Aquinas: The Person and His Work (Washington, 
D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1996). 
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latter of which he endorses. The first opinion is that grace and virtue are 
the same per essentiam.56 Thus, presumably thanks to the fact that vir-
tue is in the powers of the soul, it follows that grace must be in the 
powers of the soul “as in a subject according to the truth of the thing 
. . . but by some appropriation, it can be said . . . that grace pertains to 
the essence” of the soul. This appropriation is due not to an essential, 
but to a merely notional difference between grace and virtue. According 
to the second opinion, which Aquinas claims to support (sustinemus), 
grace and virtue are not the same per essentiam.57 But it is the very no-
tion (ratio) of virtue to perfect powers with respect to right operation. 
Thus, if grace were in the powers as its subject, grace would have to be 
the same as virtue. Since it is not the same, neither is grace in the pow-
ers of the soul. Rather, it is in the essence of the soul, giving the soul, as 
                                               
56 Leon., 22.814: 87–101: “[D]e gratia duplex est opinio: una quae dicit gratiam et vir-
tutem esse idem per essentiam; et secundum hanc necesse est dicere quod gratia sit in 
potentia animae sicut in subiecto secundum rei veritatem, eo quod virtus quae perficit 
ad operandum, nonnisi in potentia esse potest, quae est operationis principium; sed per 
quandam appropriationem potest dici secundum hanc opinionem quod gratia respicit es-
sentiam, virtus vero potentiam, secundum quod gratia et virtus, etsi non per essentiam 
saltem differunt ratione, quia gratificatio per prius ad ipsam animam pertinet quam ad 
actum eius, cum non propter actus anima acceptetur a Deo sed e converso.” 
57 Ibid., 22.814: 102–113: “Alia vero opinio, quam sustinemus, est quod gratia et virtus 
non sint idem per essentiam; et secundum hoc necesse est dicere quod gratia sit in es-
sentia animae sicut in subiecto et non in potentiis, quia, cum potentia in quantum huius-
modi ordinetur ad operationem, oportet perfectionem potentiae secundum propriam ra-
tionem ad operationem ordinari. Istud autem est quod facit rationem virtutis, ut sit pro-
xime perfectiva ad recte agendum: unde oporteret, si gratia in potentia animae esset, 
quod esset, idem cum aliqua virtutum. Si ergo hoc non sustinetur, oportet dicere quod 
gratia sit in essentia animae perficiens ipsam in quandum dat ei quoddam esse spirituale 
et facit eam per quandam assimilationem ‘consortem divinae naturae’ . . . sicut virtutes 
perficiunt potentias ad recte operandum.” For a recent studies of what the obscure 
phrase esse spirituale and the related phrase esse intentionale means in Aquinas, see: 
Stephen Brock, “Intentional Being, Natural Being, and the First-Person Perspective in 
Thomas Aquinas,” The Thomist 77, no. 1 (2013): 103–133; Gyula Klima, “Three Myths 
of Intentionality Versus Some Medieval Philosophers,” International Journal of Phil-
osophical Studies 21, no. 3 (2013): 359–376; Robert Moser, “Thomas Aquinas, Esse 
Intentionale, and the Cognitive as Such,” The Review of Metaphysics 64, no. 4 (2011): 
763–788. 




Aquinas states, a spiritual being (esse spirituale) and assimilating it to 
the divine nature. In contrast, the virtues perfect the soul with respect to 
operation, not being (esse). 
Aquinas reaches the same conclusion by essentially the same ar-
gument in his late Prima secundae, q. 110, a. 4 (1271).58 This article 
again asks about the subject of grace. Aquinas answers that, if grace is 
the same as virtue, it must be in the powers since every virtue has the 
powers of the soul for its subject. But since grace is not the same as 
virtue, but rather is prior to virtue, it must have something prior to the 
powers as its subject—namely, the essence of the soul. As one partici-
pates in divine love by the virtue of charity in one’s psychological pow-
ers, so too, one participates in the divine nature by a “recreation” in 
grace, having for its subject the essence of the soul. 
In sum, the immediate or proper subject of grace for Aquinas is 
the essence of the soul, not its powers.59 It is beyond the scope of this 
paper to consider the proper subject of glory for Aquinas, but it is clear 
                                               
58 S.Th., I–II, q. 110, a. 4, co.: “Si enim gratia sit idem quod virtus, necesse est quod sit 
in potentia animae sicut in subiecto, nam potentia animae est proprium subiectum virtu-
tis, ut supra dictum est. Si autem gratia differt a virtute, non potest dici quod potentia a-
nimae sit gratiae subiectum, quia omnis perfectio potentiae animae habet rationem vir-
tutis, ut supra dictum est. Unde relinquitur quod gratia, sicut est prius virtute, ita habeat 
subiectum prius potentiis animae, ita scilicet quod sit in essentia animae. Sicut enim . . . 
secundum potentiam voluntatis amorem divinum, per virtutem caritatis; ita etiam per 
naturam animae participat, secundum quandam similitudinem, naturam divinam, per 
quandam regenerationem sive recreationem.” 
59 De Malo, q. 4, a. 4, which asks about the subject of original sin, makes for fruitful 
comparison with the above texts from De Veritate and the Summa. Since original sin is 
the contrary of grace, and contraries have the same subject, this article provides an in-
direct or implicit argument in favor of grace being in the soul before the powers of the 
soul. De Malo, q. 4, a. 4, ad 5, in particular, implies the problem that, if grace and 
original sin were in the powers before the essence of the soul, then Adam’s descendants 
would not contract original sin by carnal descent, as the Catholic faith teaches, but by 
actual sin, as Adam did, for whom original sin began in the powers and overflowed to 
the essence of the soul. Ott notes that it is the error of Pelagius to think that original sin 
is transmitted through actual sins made by imitation of one’s parents rather than by 
physical descent without actual sin. Ott, Fundamentals of Catholic Dogma, 223. 
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from the preceding analysis that, either it is false to say that glory has 
the powers of the soul for its proper subject or we must take Aquinas’s 
identification of grace and glory in a highly qualified way. In any case, 
for Aquinas, in both the Summa and De Veritate, the conclusion that 
grace is not properly in the powers of the soul follows from the premise 
that grace is not the same as virtue. Now, as we saw, Williams uses this 
same premise—namely, that grace is not virtue—in order to prove that 
grace is uncreated or God himself. By looking at Aquinas’s categorial 
classification of grace, let us see why it is that this premise supports A-
quinas’s own conclusion about grace being in the essence of the soul, 
but does not support Williams’ conclusion about grace being uncreated. 
Again, we will consider De Veritate and the Summa theologiae in turn. 
De Veritate, q. 27, a. 2, asks whether grace is the same as charity. 
The body of the article makes clear that Aquinas intends to distinguish 
grace not only from charity, but from virtue in general.60 To answer the 
question, Aquinas draws an analogy between nature and grace. There 
are, Aquinas says, three prerequisites for attaining the end of a natural 
thing: the nature itself fitted to the end, the inclination to the end, and 
the motion to the end.61 For instance, earth has a certain nature suited to 
being at the middle of the world, an inclination to that end, and, assum-
ing there are no obstacles, a motion to that end as well. But since there 
is an end for humans above the natural end of contemplation attributed 
to humans by the philosophers, it follows that man must be elevated in 
his nature so as to be suited to such an end, must receive an inclination 
                                               
60 Cf. Leon., 22.793: 99–101: “Dicendum quod quidam dicunt quod gratia est idem per 
essentiam quod virtus secundum rem.” 
61 Ibid., 22.794: 110–121: “Cum enim diversarum naturarum diversi sint fines, ad con-
secutionem alicuius finis in rebus naturalibus tria praeexiguntur, scilicet natura pro-
poritonata ad finem illum, et inclinatio in illum finem, quae est naturalis appetitus finis, 
et motus in finem; sicut patet quod in terra est natura quaedam per quam sibi competit 
esse in medio, et hanc naturam sequitur inclinatio in locum medium secundum quam 
appetit naturaliter talem locum, etiam cum extra ipsum per violentiam detinetur; et ideo 
remoto prohibente per deorsum movetur.” 




thereto, and must be moved thereto.62 Grace, Aquinas says, elevates hu-
man nature, charity constitutes a new inclination in humans to their new 
higher end, and the other virtues provide for the motion to that higher 
end. In short, if grace were reduced to virtue in general or charity in 
particular, then, by grace, humans would receive an inclination and mo-
tion to a supernatural divine end without their natures being first made 
proportional to that end. This is as impossible as for a stone to be given 
the inclination and act of hearing without any change to its nature. 
In Prima secundae, q. 110, a. 3, which asks whether grace is the 
same as virtue, Aquinas reaches this same conclusion, but does so by a 
new argument. Now, Aquinas points out that virtue must be defined in 
reference to “some preexistent nature.”63 This was how Aquinas de-
fined virtue in Prima secundae, q. 49, a. 2, when he derived the four 
species of the Aristotelian category, quality, in order to determine the 
genus of virtue, which is habit (habitus). The fourth species of quality 
determines a subject in accidental being (esse accidentale) with respect 
to quantity; the second and third species do so with respect to action 
and passion, respectively; and the first species does so with respect to 
the nature of the thing.64 In q. 49, a. 2, ad 3, Aquinas had further sub-
divided the first species of quality into two subspecies: habits and dis-
positions. Habits, he said, are rooted in some unchangeable cause, but 
                                               
62 Ibid., 22.794: 121–148. 
63 S.Th., I–II, q. 110, a. 3, co.: “Ex quo patet quod virtus uniuscuiusque rei dicitur in 
ordine ad aliquam naturam praeexistentem, quando scilicet unumquodque sic est dispo-
situm, secundum quod congruit suae naturae.” 
64 Ibid., I–II, q. 49, a. 2, co.: “Modus autem sive determinatio subiecti secundum esse 
accidentale, potest accipi vel in ordine ad ipsam naturam subiecti; vel secundum ac-
tionem et passionem quae consequuntur principia naturae, quae sunt materia et forma; 
vel secundum quantitatem. Si autem accipiatur modus vel determinatio subiecti secun-
dum quantitatem, sic est quarta species qualitatis . . . Modus autem sive determinatio 
subiecti secundum actionem et passionem, attenditur in secunda et tertia specie qualita-
tis . . . Sed modus et determinatio subiecti in ordine ad naturam rei, pertinet ad primam 
speciem qualitatis, quae est habitus et dispositio.” 
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dispositions in some changeable one. Aquinas’s examples of these two 
species indicate that what he has in mind by this distinction is that hab-
its are in the soul (an unchangeable cause) whereas dispositions are in 
the body (a changeable cause). This interpretation is supported by Pri-
ma secundae, q. 50, a. 1, where Aquinas says that “no habit is prin-
cipally in a body as its subject,” and that long-lasting bodily disposi-
tions, like beauty and health, have the character of habits only imper-
fectly since “the causes of them are by nature easily changeable.”65 
Whereas dispositions determine their subject, a body, in reference to 
the coming to be or passing away of some nature, habits determine their 
subject, the soul, not with respect to the generation or corruption of a 
nature, but with respect to the operations consequent upon a preexistent 
nature.66 So, it is not the case that virtues, which are habits, simply hap-
pen to be in reference to a preexistent nature. It is part of the essence of 
virtue to be in the soul, ordering its powers to operations befitting a pre-
existent nature. Having made this point, Aquinas, in q. 110, a. 3, goes 
on to draw a distinction between infused and acquired virtues.67 Ac-
quired virtues are in reference to human nature itself, but the infused 
virtues are in reference to a higher nature—the participated divine na-
                                               
65 Ibid., I–II, q. 50, a. 1, co.: “[N]ullus habitus est principaliter in corpore sicut in su-
biecto.” Ibid.: “Si vero loquamur de dispositione subiecti ad formam, sic habitualis dis-
positio potest esse in corpore, quod comparatur ad animam sicut subiectum ad formam. 
Et hoc modo sanitas et pulchritudo, et huiusmodi, habituales dispositiones dicuntur. 
Non tamen perfecte habent rationem habituum, quia causae eorum ex sua natura de fa-
cili transmutabiles sunt.” 
66 Cf. ibid., I–II, q. 49, a. 3. 
67 Ibid., I–II, q. 110, a. 3, co.: “[V]irtutes acquisitae per actus humanos, de quibus supra 
dictum est, sunt dispositiones quibus homo convenienter disponitur in ordine ad natu-
ram qua homo est. Virtutes autem infusae disponunt hominem altiori modo, et ad altio-
rem finem, unde etiam oportet quod in ordine ad aliquam altiorem naturam. Hoc autem 
est in ordine ad naturam divinam participatam . . . Sicut igitur lumen naturale rationis 
est aliquid praeter virtutes acquisitas, quae dicuntur in ordine ad ipsum lumen naturale; 
ita etiam ipsum lumen gratiae, quod est participatio divinae naturae, est aliquid praeter 
virtutes infusas, quae a lumine illo derivantur, et ad illud lumen ordinantur.” 




ture. Thus, in order for man to have infused virtues, there must be some-
thing in man prior to virtue—namely, grace—which constitutes man’s 
participation in that higher or divine nature. So, grace is not the same 
thing as virtue. 
Now, while Aquinas’s argument in q. 110, a. 3, that grace is not 
virtue relies implicitly on his previous derivation of the Aristotelian 
species of quality in q. 49, a. 2, the third objection in q. 110, a. 3 ap-
peals to that same earlier text to draw the opposite conclusion. It states 
that grace is a quality. But it is not in the fourth, third, or second spe-
cies. Thus, it must be in the first species. But if grace is in the first spe-
cies, it is either a habit or a disposition. Now, habits in the mind, like 
grace, are virtues; so grace is a virtue. Aquinas replies by saying that 
grace is in the first species, but that it is so by reduction and without 
thereby being a virtue.68 
This reply is significant for answering both Williams’ argument 
about virtue as well as the Rahner-Ebacher argument about mystery. 
Let us begin with Williams’ argument. Aquinas clearly does not deny 
that grace is virtue in order to indicate that grace is uncreated, as Wil-
liams would have it. Indeed, an article earlier,69 Aquinas asked whether 
grace was a quality and answered affirmatively. Then in the reply to the 
second objection in that article he stated that grace has an inferior mode 
of being (modus essendi) to the soul since the soul subsists in itself, but 
grace, being an accident, is a form inhering in the soul.70 It is impos-
                                               
68 Ibid., I–II, q. 110, a. 3, ad 3: “[G]ratia reducitur ad primam speciem qualitatis. Nec 
tamen est idem quod virtus, sed habitudo quaedam quae praesupponitur virtutibus infu-
sis, sicut earum principium et radix.” 
69 I.e., S.Th., I–II, q. 110, a. 2. 
70 This incidentally also undermines Ebacher’s assertion that grace is received accord-
ing to God’s “own proper modality.” Ebacher, “Grace and Supernaturalization,” 23. 
Grace is received in the imperfect modality of an accident, not in the supremely perfect 
modality of the Creator. For a recent and now standard interpretation of what Aquinas 
means by the phrase modus essendi, see: John Tomarchio, “Aquinas’s Division of Be-
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sible to read this in a way compatible with grace being the uncreated 
God himself, as Williams interprets Aquinas’s thinking. Grace, unlike 
God, is not only in a created category (i.e., quality), but it also has an 
imperfect creaturely mode of existence. So, the reason Aquinas denies 
that grace is virtue is not in order to show that grace is uncreated or to 
deny that grace is a “pure effect,” but rather merely to put grace in a 
different species of effect than virtue. 
But what species of effect is grace in? Aquinas says it is reduced 
to the first species of quality, but that is hardly a satisfying answer. 
Why is it “reduced” to that species and not properly contained in it? 
Pursuant of answers to these questions, we must turn to the problem 
raised by Ebacher and Rahner. According to them, God alone is a mys-
tery. So, grace cannot be mysterious unless it is God himself and not 
some creature. All creatures, thinks Ebacher, are “per se knowable,” as 
we have seen. Since grace is a mystery, it must be uncreated. Contrary 
to these assertions, we will see below that, despite being a creature, 
grace is not known by humans with certainty. Moreover, it is mysteri-
ous as well and its mysteriousness is what accounts for its inability to 
be placed without qualification in either of the two Aristotelian subspe-
cies of the first species of quality—namely, habits and dispositions. 
The term “consciousness” is ambiguous in a Thomistic context 
since Aquinas himself almost never uses this term. Colloquially, we 
tend to use the word “conscious” for two distinct things. On the one 
hand, sometimes we use the term quite broadly in a way practically 
synonymous with “knowledge.” For instance, an employer may say, “I 
am conscious of the fact that you signed up for vacation next week, but 
recent events will require you to come into work anyway.”71 On the 
                                               
ing According to Modes of Existing,” The Review of Metaphysics 54, no. 3 (2001): 
585–613. 
71 This is the way Aquinas uses conscius in S.Th., I–II, q. 112, a. 5, co.: “[E]t inquantum 
homo non est conscius sibi alicuius peccati mortalis.” 




other hand, sometimes we use the word “conscious” in a narrower sense 
in which it designates only our relation to those objects falling immedi-
ately and actually into a perceptual faculty. It is in this narrower sense 
that someone could say, “I am conscious of redness and sweetness, but 
not of the apple itself, which I eat.”72 Just as we ought to keep distinct 
these two senses of “conscious,” we should also keep in mind the dis-
tinction between a thing’s knowability by us and a thing’s being a mys-
tery. For Aquinas, the divine nature and Trinity are both surely mys-
teries, but both are knowable by us in this life, and the former is even 
imperfectly knowable by unaided natural reason.73 
So, we have three distinct questions before us: Are we conscious 
of grace in the narrow sense? Do we know grace? And is grace a mys-
tery? The last of these questions relates to Aquinas’s strange classifica-
tion of grace by reduction to the first species of quality. In Prima se-
cundae, q. 112, a. 5, which asks whether anyone can know that they 
have grace, Aquinas states that, apart from special divine revelation, no 
one can know with certainty that he or she has grace. That’s because, 
contrary to Ebacher’s assertion, Aquinas does not think that all crea-
tures are per se knowable. As Aquinas suggests in other texts, some 
things are known with certainty from being per se knowable to us, oth-
ers from being demonstrated through necessary relations to what is per 
se knowable to us, and still others from a contingent relation to some-
thing per se knowable.74 The first two kinds are known with certainty. 
Since no one has knowledge of the proper principle of grace, God him-
self, Aquinas reasons that no one can demonstrate with certainty the 
presence of grace in the soul.75 Instead, Aquinas says that our knowl-
                                               
72 Cf. S.Th., I, q. 13, a. 8, co. 
73 Ibid., I, q. 2, a. 2. 
74 Cf. ibid., I–II, q. 94, a. 2; ibid., I, q. 82, a. 2; ibid., I–II, q. 57, a. 2. 
75 Ibid., I–II, q. 112, a. 5, co.: “Alio modo homo cognoscit aliquid per seipsum, et hoc 
certitudinaliter. Et sic nullus potest scire se habere gratiam. Certitudo enim non potest 
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edge of grace is limited to conjectural knowledge through signs.76 These 
signs seem to be things of which we are consciously aware (in the nar-
row sense) and which are the effect of grace. Examples of these are de-
light in God and contempt for the world, both of which are operations 
or acts in the powers of the soul. Since, as we have shown contrary to 
Ebacher, grace is not itself in the powers of the soul, we are not imme-
diately aware or conscious of it in the way we are conscious of its ef-
fects. Nevertheless, we have uncertain knowledge or a suspicion of it 
from these effects, and thus, we can say in a broad sense of the word 
that we are “conscious” of having grace. If this broad sense of “con-
sciousness” is all that is intended by Rahner and Ebacher, then both au-
thors are correct that we may be conscious of grace. 
Now, despite the fact that grace is a creature in the category qual-
ity and even known conjecturally from its effects, nevertheless, grace is 
a mystery. The reason for this can be seen by an analogy between re-
creation in grace and the mystery of creation ex nihilo. In De Veritate, 
q. 27, a. 6, Aquinas asks whether any creature can cause grace. Aquinas 
answers negatively.77 Grace in itself, Aquinas says, is a perfection ele-
                                               
haberi de aliquo, nisi possit diiudicari per proprium principium, sic enim certitudo ha-
betur de conclusionibus demonstrativis per indemonstrabilia universalia principia; nul-
lus autem posset scire se habere scientiam alicuius conclusionis, si principium ignora-
ret. Principium autem gratiae, et obiectum eius, est ipse Deus, qui propter sui excellen-
tiam est nobis ignotus.” 
76 Ibid., I–II, q. 112, a. 5, co.: “Tertio modo cognoscitur aliquid coniecturaliter per ali-
qua signa. Et hoc modo aliquis cognoscere potest se habere gratiam, inquantum scilicet 
percipit se delectari in Deo, et contemnere res mundanas; et inquantum homo non est 
conscius sibi alicuius peccati mortalis.” 
77 Leon., 22.797–798: 209–226: “[G]ratiam effective nulla creatura causare potest . . . 
Prima sumitur ex condicione ipsius gratiae. Gratia enim, ut dictum est, est quaedam 
perfectio elevans animam ad quoddam esse supernaturale; nullus autem effectus super-
naturalis potest esse ab aliqua creatura, duplici ratione: primo quidem quia eius solius 
est rem ultra statum naturae promovere, cuius est gradus naturae statuere et limitare, 
quod solius Dei esse constat; secundo quia nulla virtus creata agit nisi praesupposita po-
tentia materiae vel alicuius loco materiae; potentia autem naturalis creaturae non se ex-




vating the soul to a certain supernatural existence (esse supernaturale). 
From this fact, two considerations prevent any creature from causing 
grace. First, it pertains to God alone to delimit the various grades of na-
ture. Second, no creature can make things but by means of some pre-
existing potency or subject. But no creature is naturally in potency to be 
elevated to higher than natural perfections. Thus, no creature can cause 
grace. Here, we see that, although grace accrues to a preexistent sub-
ject, like ordinary accidents, it is unlike ordinary accidents in two sig-
nificant ways. As Aquinas says in his derivation of the species of qual-
ity in Prima secundae, q. 49, a. 2, accidental qualities determine a sub-
ject with respect to accidental being (esse accidentale). In contrast, 
grace, as a new quasi-specific difference superadded to an already com-
plete nature, determines its subject neither with respect to accidental or 
substantial being, but instead with respect to esse supernaturale.78 Sec-
                                               
tendit ultra perfectiones naturales; unde nullam supernaturalem operationem aliqua cre-
atura efficere potest.” 
78 A few clarifications should be noted about esse supernaturale and esse spirituale. It 
is doubtful that esse supernaturale should be conflated with esse spirituale, which is al-
so spoken of as an effect of grace (e.g., De Veritate, q. 27, a. 1, ad 3). The latter term is 
also apparently associated with the sensible forms found in the sense powers (e.g., 
S.Th., I, q. 78, a. 3). A thing is said to have esse spirituale not necessarily because of its 
having the exalted mode of being of an immaterial substance, like God or an angel, but 
instead because of its separation from its proper matter, subject, or condition. For in-
stance, the form of a house in the mind of the builder has esse spirituale because, in the 
mind, this form does not have for its subject brick and mortar, but instead the potential 
intellect. De Veritate, q. 27, a. 7, co. Likewise, the species of color are said to be in the 
air spiritually, not naturally. De Veritate, q. 27, a. 4, ad 4. By extension, we can talk of 
the divine nature being present through esse spirituale or esse intentionale in a creature 
since it is not God’s proper condition to be in a created subject. It is in a similar way 
that Aquinas can speak of grace being in the sacraments not with esse naturale, but as 
the species of colors are in the air—namely, spiritually. See: De Veritate, q. 27, a. 4, ad 
4 and De Veritate, q. 27, a. 7, co. On the other hand, sometimes—for instance, when 
paraphrasing Pseudo-Dionysius—Aquinas does use the phrase esse spirituale not to re-
fer to a non-natural mode of being, as in the cases just mentioned, but instead in a way 
more or less synonymous with esse supernaturale. See, e.g.: De Veritate, q. 27, a. 2, co. 
(Leon., 22.794: 150–154): “[N]on potest aliquis habere spiritualem operationem nisi 
prius esse spirituale accipiat, sicut nec operationem alicuius naturae nisi prius habeat 
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ondly, grace is unlike other qualities in that it is like a quasi-first act, 
not a second act. Although grace is an accident and, therefore, presup-
poses a preexistent subject in act, nevertheless, it is like an entirely new 
substance or creation. That’s because the subject to which grace is add-
ed is not in natural potency to the perfection that grace gives. So, al-
though “creation” only properly befits substances, not accidents or parts 
of substances, as Aquinas says elsewhere,79 nevertheless, it is more prop-
er to say the grace is “created” and that receiving grace is a new “birth” 
than to say this of other accidents, such as virtues or vital operations. 
That’s because, as we have said, grace is like a new specific difference 
without any proper subject. It is like a new essence from a new creation 
                                               
esse in natura illa.” For recent authors debating the significance of the phrase esse spiri-
tuale in Aquinas’s psychology, see: footnote 57. Another thing to note concerning the 
phrase esse supernaturale, is that, although this is often translated as “supernatural ex-
istence,” it is, in my opinion, an open question whether the phrase esse supernaturale 
refers to an act of existence or to a certain essence or form. Aquinas says that esse 
sometimes signifies the essence or nature of a thing. See: In I Sent., d. 33, q. 1, a. 1, ad 
1 (Mandonnet 766). To my mind, it is highly implausible that esse supernaturale signi-
fies an act of existence. For one thing, this would mean that grace confers a new act of 
existence. Apart from the problems posed by the very notion of an act of existence in 
the first place (at least as this is understood by existential Thomists), a thing receiving a 
new act of existence is also improbable inasmuch as it is hard to see how something 
that already exists can receive a new act of existence or what it would mean for an 
already existing thing to gain a new act of existence. If such a position is intelligible at 
all, it seems to be nothing but a poetic way of speaking about the acquisition of a new 
condition or quality. In that case, the esse supernaturale formally caused by grace is 
nothing except the condition of being divinized itself—that is, the quality itself as pos-
sessed—just as the being white caused by the form of whiteness is nothing but the qual-
ity of whiteness itself as possessed by a surface. For a wider consideration of the prob-
lem of Aquinas using esse to refer to essence or form, not existence, see: Elliot Polsky, 
“‘In as Many Ways as Something is Predicated . . . in that Many Ways is Something 
Signified to Be’: The Logic behind Thomas Aquinas’s Predication Thesis, Esse Sub-
stantiale, and Esse in Rerum Natura,” Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosoph-
ical Association 93 (2019): 263–292; as well as Gregory Doolan’s working essay, “A-
quinas on the Distinction between Esse and Esse: How the Name ‘Esse’ Signifies Es-
sence in Metaphysics Δ.7,” which is available online—see the section References for 
details. 
79 S.Th., I–II, q. 110, a. 2, ad 3. 




quasi-ex nihilo. If creation ex nihilo is a mystery, then surely so too is 
grace which is like a new creation. 
The result of this analysis is that grace does not properly fit into 
either of Aristotle’s two subspecies within the first species of quality—
namely, dispositions and habits. Like habits, grace is in the soul, not the 
body. But unlike habits, and like dispositions, grace is ordered directly 
not to an operation or second act, but to a certain nature—namely, the 
divine nature. It is this essential reference to the mystery of the divine 
nature and the spiritual existence of that nature brought about by grace 
in the soul that makes grace itself a mystery. Yet, the mystery of grace 
is also inseparable from the fact that grace is a creature—an accident 
even in the category quality. 
*** 
Rahner, Ebacher, and Williams each in their own way argue that 
sanctifying grace—the grace by which we become justified and con-
formed to the divine nature—is itself the uncreated God as participated 
by creatures. Previous authors have responded to this conclusion, but 
they have left unanswered several key arguments brought forward by 
their interlocutors. In this paper, we have tried to answer these unan-
swered arguments by addressing the three questions: What is the sub-
ject of grace? What is the proper classification of grace within the Aris-
totelian categorial scheme? And is grace something of which we are 
conscious and is it a mystery? 
The answers to each of these questions are related. It was be-
cause Ebacher thought that grace had the powers of the soul for its im-
mediate subject that he thought that we had immediate knowledge of 
God’s essence in grace. Things in the powers of the soul, such as our 
operations of delight and contempt, are things of which we have im-
mediate awareness and of which we can be conscious. Since, however, 
contrary to Ebacher’s saying, grace has for its subject not the powers of 
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the soul, but the very essence of the soul, it follows that we do not have 
immediate awareness of grace. Rather, grace is known conjecturally by 
the operations of the soul’s powers, which are the signs and effects of 
grace. Moreover, the place of grace in the essence of the soul rather 
than its powers is also related to the mystery of grace and its sui generis 
classification. Since, for Aquinas, what grace confers to its subject is 
not some accidental determination in accidental being, but an additional 
quasi-specific difference, determining the soul to esse supernaturale, it 
follows that the generation of grace is not like other accidental changes, 
but is like a new birth and a new creation capable of being brought a-
bout by none other than the omnipotent God. Just as creation ex nihilo 
is a mystery, so too, grace, which fails to be neatly contained within Ar-
istotle’s species of being, is a mystery. Yet, this mystery of grace is not 
from the fact that grace is uncreated, but precisely from its character as 






Thomas Aquinas on Grace as a Mysterious Kind of Creature 
SUMMARY 
Although the question of whether, in the thought of Thomas Aquinas, sanctifying grace 
is “created” or “uncreated” has received considerable attention in the last several dec-
ades, many of the questions and arguments proposed by those, such as Karl Rahner, Je-
rome Ebacher, and Anna N. Williams, in favor of grace being uncreated have gone un-
answered. Among these ancillary questions and arguments are those concerning the 
proper subject of grace, the categorial classification of grace, and the reason for the 
mystery and unconsciousness of grace. These questions appear unrelated, but, as this 
paper argues, they are each logically connected to each other and to the overall thesis 
that sanctifying grace is created, not uncreated. This paper aims to make Aquinas’s the-
sis that grace is created more palatable to objectors by addressing each of these previ-
ously unaddressed ancillary questions. 
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